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Abstract 
When competitors for a federal government contract feel that the contract has 
been unfairly or unlawfully awarded, they can protest the contract award.  A protest 
stops a contract award while the protest is evaluated for merit and remedy, as 
appropriate.  While legitimate award protests improve procurement efficiency, 
integrity, and accountability, frivolous award protests create significant contract 
delays and cost growth.  There is increasing interest in mechanisms that reduce 
frivolous contract award protests, while retaining the integrity of the process for 
meritorious protests. 
This research explores split procurement awards as a tool to rationalize the 
bid protest process and potentially improve the general procurement process.  It 
discusses split procurement as an award protest and procurement management 
tool, and models bidding incentives and outcomes with both fixed or exogenous split 
awards and variable or endogenous split awards (where the split depends on the 
relative competitiveness of the vendors’ bids).  Endogenous split awards can 
increase the competitiveness of vendor bids relative to fixed-split awards, while 
reducing the incentives for frivolous contract protests.  Endogenously split contract 
awards can also improve the general acquisition process, particularly if retaining 
competition is important for follow-on procurement actions. 
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Introduction 
Whenever competitors or potential competitors for a federal government 
contract feel that the contract has been, or is about to be, unfairly or unlawfully 
awarded, or that they have been unfairly denied the opportunity to compete for a 
contract, they can protest the contract award.  This is referred to as a bid protest 
(GAO, 2009).  A bid protest has the potential to stop a contract award while the 
protest is evaluated for merit and remedy, as appropriate.  While legitimate bid 
protests improve government contracting by encouraging procurement competition, 
integrity, transparency, and accountability, frivolous bid protests can create 
significant contract delays, cost growth, and, potentially, operational performance 
gaps.  Furthermore, the mere threat of frivolous protests may discourage some 
potential bidders, reducing competition, or may be used strategically by losing 
bidders to extract concessions from the winning bidder or procuring agency (e.g., 
subcontracts; Melese et al., 2010, pp. 16–21). 
Contract award protests have recently received increasing attention (Castelli, 
2009; Censer, 2010).  This reflects a few high-profile contract award protest cases, 
including the Air Force’s new KC-X aerial refueling tanker (Gates, 2008; O’Rourke, 
2009; GAO, 2008a, 2008b), as well as perceptions that protests have been 
increasing in frequency and in the dollar value of the impacted contracts (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2009; Melese et al., 2010).  As a result, there is increasing interest in 
mechanisms that reduce frivolous contract award protests, while retaining the 
integrity of the process for meritorious protests. 
This research explores split procurements as a management tool to help 
rationalize the bid protest process and potentially improve the procurement process 
in general.  The analysis adopts the paradigm that potential protestors decide 
whether to file a bid protest based on the expected costs and benefits of their 
actions.  Unsuccessful bidders are more likely to file protests when the potential 
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the benefits are lower and/or the costs are higher.  By awarding the less competitive 
bidders a portion of the contract, splitting contract awards across two or more 
vendors can reduce the benefits of a protest.  The mechanism ultimately proposed in 
this research ties the contract splits (or shares) to the relative competitiveness of the 
winning and losing bids. 
It is important to recognize that the goal is not to minimize the number of bid 
protests, but to “right size” the number of such protests.  The process should 
encourage protests that correct “significant” procurement mistakes, whether they be 
honest mistakes (e.g., information limitations, bounded rationality, etc.) or dishonest 
mistakes (e.g., government decision-maker bias or fraud, etc.), while discouraging 
frivolous or inconsequential protests.  Split procurements could provide one lever to 
appropriately filter out many frivolous or inefficient bid protests while preserving 
incentives for meritorious and valuable protests. 
This paper reviews the bid protest process and past data (protests filed and 
upheld), discusses split procurement as a bid protest and procurement management 
tool, models bidding incentives and outcomes with fixed or exogenous split awards 
(splits determined ex ante), and, finally, models bidding incentives and outcomes 
with endogenous split awards (splits determined ex post).  Model results 
demonstrate that endogenous split awards can increase the competitiveness of 
vendor bids relative to fixed-split awards, while also reducing the incentives for 
frivolous contract protests.  Endogenously split contract awards can also improve the 
acquisition process in general, particularly if retaining competition is important for 
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Bid Protest Rules and Historic Data 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2005) defines a bid protest as 
follows: 
Protest means a written objection by an interested party to any of the 
following: (1) A solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a 
contract for the procurement of property or services, (2) The cancellation of 
the solicitation or other request, (3) An award or proposed award of the 
contract, (4) A termination or cancellation of an award of the contract if the 
written objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is 
based in whole or part on improprieties concerning the award of the contract.  
(Subpart 33.101; see also Competition in Contracting Act, 1984, § 3551[1]) 
Recognizing that bid protests can provide oversight against bias, fraud, and 
unintended errors in the procurement process, thereby fostering competition and 
increasing efficiency, timeliness, and operational performance, the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA) was enacted in 1984 (Title 31 of the U.S. Code, Sections 
3551–3556),1 supplementing the FAR (Parts 5, 10, 12–15, and 33).  The CICA 
codified the current bid protest process and the Government Accountability Office’s 
(GAO) authority to adjudicate bid protests.  However, law also allows dissatisfied 
bidders to file protests with the procuring agency or the Court of Federal Claims.  
Between 2001 and 2007, 9,281 federal bid protests were filed with GAO, while only 
424 were filed with the Court of Federal Claims (4.4% of the total; Schaengold, 
Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255); there is no comprehensive data on protests filed with 
the procuring agency.  This analysis focuses exclusively on GAO protests.2 
A GAO protest begins when an unsuccessful bidder files a formal objection 
(Figure 1).  The GAO adjudication process basically involves two steps.  First, the 
                                            
1 For further discussion, see Melese et al. (2010).  As reported in Melese et al., GAO 
and CFC statistics were drawn from Schaengold, Guiffré, and Gill (2009, p. 255). 
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GAO determines if the protest has merit; if not, it is dismissed prior to the 
cumbersome discovery and review process.  Protests found to have merit are then 
reviewed and either sustained or not.  If sustained, some remedial action is imposed 
(e.g., a new contract solicitation).  The GAO tries to balance expediency with 
accuracy in resolving contract disputes.  Expediency favors a quick resolution, while 
accuracy may require a more deliberative process.  The CICA requires that the GAO 
resolve all bid protests within 100 calendar days, a statutory deadline the GAO has 
never failed to meet (GAO, 2009, p. 4).  In fact, the GAO reports that over 50% of 
DoD protests are closed within 30 days, typically cases that are found to lack merit 
(GAO, 2009, p. 10). 
 
Figure 1. Stylized Bid Protest Process  
Note. This figure was adapted from Melese et al. (2010, p. 62). 
For reference, the number of DoD protests filed with the GAO that were 
closed between 2001 and 2008 is shown in Figure 2.  Figure 2 also shows the 
percent of closed protests found to have merit and the percent sustained.  Over this 
period, the protests found to have merit averaged approximately 24% of protests 
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Figure 2. DoD Bid Protests Filed With the GAO, Merit and Sustainment  
Determination Rates 
(Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2009) 
Despite the relatively low number of meritorious and sustained protests, there 
is concern that these often involve large acquisition programs; mere numbers may 
understate the relative impact of bid protests.  Melese et al. (2010) observed that 
only three U.S. Air Force (USAF) protests were sustained in 2001, out of 98 protests 
closed that year; there were only two sustained protests out of 112 closed in 2008.  
From this perspective, bid protests appear to be insignificant and stable or even 
declining. 
In terms of dollar value, the three USAF protests sustained in 2001 involved 
contracts worth roughly $260 million, impacting around 1% of the total 2001 
competitive procurement dollars.  The two USAF protests sustained in 2008 involved 
contracts worth over $36 billion, impacting nearly 97% of USAF competitive 
procurement dollars in 2008.  While the number of sustained protests may be low, 
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According to Gansler and Lucyshyn (2009), the DoD completed 7,711,596 
contract actions between 2001 and 2008.  Only 61 contract awards exceeded $1 
billion in value, but 53 of those contracts faced sustained protests.  Gansler and 
Lucyshyn (2009) concluded that bid protests are not a large problem relative to all 
DoD contract awards, but they appear problematic for complex, high-value 
contracts.  As they observe, “there is no disincentive to try for another bite at the 
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Managing Bid Protests 
As noted previously, bid protests are intended to correct mistakes in contract 
awards and terminations, whether honest (imperfect information) or dishonest (bias 
or fraud).  The goal is to “manage,” not minimize, protests.  The DoD should 
encourage protests that correct more significant mistakes, while discouraging 
protests that are frivolous or address relatively insignificant corrections. 
This discussion does not distinguish between inadvertent and unintentional 
mistakes or more malicious and intentional mistakes.  A contract award or 
termination mistake will have the same impact whether unintentional or otherwise.  
Furthermore, this discussion does not assume that the current incidence of bid 
protests is too high or too low.  Bid protest management requires creating larger 
incentives to file protests when the potential mistakes are larger, while reducing the 
incentive to file protests when potential mistakes are smaller. 
For reference, Gansler and Lucyshyn (2009) examined justifications for 
sustained DoD bid protests between 2001 and 2008.  They found that agency 
misevaluation was the most common justification, including alleged errors in source 
selection, past performance evaluation, technical evaluation, cost evaluation, and 
information dissemination (meaningful discussions).  Other common justifications 
included inconsistencies in evaluation criteria and the Request for Proposals (RFP) 
terms, contracts awarded to bidders who are outside the terms of the RFP, and 
other (small business concerns not addressed, contractors eliminated from 
consideration for no apparent good reason, awards made to contracts at prices 
exceeding the RFP requirements). 
Recognizing these justifications, recommendations to improve acquisition 
decisions and reduce bid protests frequently center on more standardized reporting 
and proposal evaluation processes, better defense acquisition workforce training, 
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and so forth.  These efforts can be characterized as reducing the likelihood of a 
successful protest by reducing the probability of mistakes in contract awards, hence 
reducing the probability that a protest will be meritorious and sustained. 
Taking a slightly different approach, this research models bid protest 
decisions as occurring within a benefit-cost framework.  Dissatisfied bidders will file 
a bid protest when they expect the potential benefit from protesting to exceed the 
expected protest cost.  Protest costs include filing and documentation costs, legal 
fees, potential reputation costs, and opportunity costs associated with the resources 
committed to the protest; they could also include any penalties imposed on losing or 
frivolous protestors, though none are currently imposed.  The benefits from a protest 
include the expected profits to be gained through the protest; the expected profit is 
the gain if the protest is successful multiplied by the probability of success.  A 
dissatisfied bidder will file a protest if the expected benefits exceed the expected 
costs. 
This characterization highlights three potential levers to manage bid protests:  
protest costs, the probability of success, and the gain if successful.  The more 
traditional efforts to manage (typically reduce) bid protests, as described previously, 
effectively focus on reducing the probability of a successful protest by reducing both 
honest and dishonest mistakes.  Increasing protest costs and decreasing the gains 
from protests have received less attention.3  This research addresses the potential 
gain from a protest as a bid protest management tool. 
                                            
3 Gansler and Lucyshyn (2009) do suggest that the DoD should examine 
disincentives to filing protests.  Much like National Football League coaches who 
lose a timeout if they protest a call and the call is upheld, Gansler and Lucyshyn 
suggest the DoD consider “punishing” contractors that file protests that lack merit or 
are not sustained by including that information as part of the contractor’s past history 
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Modeling Bid Protests 
Consider a model driven by imperfect ex ante information regarding 
contractors’ actual performance (costs, technical performance, schedule, and the 
tradeoffs between these elements).  This model presumes that small mistakes are 
more likely than big mistakes, whether the mistake is inadvertent or intentional 
(intentional mistakes due to bias or favoritism are more transparent as information 
becomes more perfect and distributed).  This characterization accurately reflects 
past empirical results.  Imperfect information is consistent with agency misevaluation 
and other protest justifications cited by Gansler and Lucyshyn (2009); the hypothesis 
that small mistakes are more common than large mistakes is consistent with the 
small fraction of protests found to be meritorious and sustained. 
For simplicity, consider a model with two potential vendors and one buyer.  
The vendors both supply the same product, but offer different prices.4  Each vendor 
faces a different cost to supply the item in question.  Vendors submit proposed 
prices in a competitive solicitation, though the buyer has some uncertainty regarding 
the terms of pricing in the proposal.  The buyer selects the winning vendor based on 
their perceived prices and awards the contract.  The losing contractor decides 
whether to file a protest.  If the protest is filed, the contract award is canceled and 
the protestor and buyer incur protest costs; the submissions are reevaluated and 
prices are determined with certainty.  The contract is re-awarded, either to the 
original contractor or the protesting contractor, depending on the reevaluation 
results.  Model notation and a process diagram are provided in Figure 3. 
Model Notation: 
Ci  Cost for vendor i 
                                            
4 This model can generalize to multiple vendors and products with multiple attributes.  
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Pi  Perceived bid price for vendor i 
PiT True bid price for vendor i (revealed by protest or 
contract completion) 
Kp Cost to losing vendor of filing protest (research, legal 
fees, reputational penalty, opportunity cost) 
Kb Protest costs incurred by buyer (reevaluation) 
X Quantity purchased 
X × PiT Revenues for vendor i (i.e., buyer’s payment to vendor i) 
X × Ci Production costs for vendor i  
Prob(PjT<PiT|Pj>Pi) Probability of sustained protest (probability PjT<PiT when 
Pj>Pi) 
 
Figure 3. Bid and Protest Process Flow 
Note that the expected cost of filing—and pursuing to completion—a bid 
protest includes the vendor’s research fees, legal fees, and reputational penalty, as 
well as opportunity costs, and is given by Kp. Meanwhile, the probability of a 
successful protest by a losing vendor j is the probability that PjT < PiT when Pj > Pi, or 
Prob(PjT < PiT|P j> Pi). Thus, the expected benefits are the vendor’s profits if selected 
multiplied by the probability of a successful protest, or X(PjT – Cj) × Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > 
Pi).  
Since the expected profit from filing a protest is equal to the expected benefits 
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Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi) × X(PjT – Cj) – Kp (1) 
The losing vendor will thus file a protest if and only if 
Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi) × X(PjT – Cj) > Kp. (2) 
Recall that the goal in managing bid protests is to encourage protests that 
address potentially significant mistakes while discouraging protests where the 
mistakes are insignificant or frivolous.  From Equation 2, there are three control 
levers to manage bid protests: 
1. Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi), the probability of success; 
2. Kp, protest costs; or 
3. X(PjT – Cj), the gains from a protest. 
As described previously, bid protest “remedies” commonly address the first 
lever, the probability of success, by improving the initial assessment accuracy.  
There has been some limited attention on influencing protest costs, particularly by 
imposing a financial or reputational penalty on unsuccessful protestors.  There has 
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Managing Protest Incentives With Split Award 
Contracts 
One mechanism for adjusting and controlling the potential gain from a protest 
is the utilization of split award contracts.  In a winner-takes-all contract award, the 
potential gain in procurement quantity from a successful protest is X, the entire 
quantity purchased.  If the losing bidder receives a share of the procurement 
quantity, the gain from a successful protest is limited to the increase in the 
protestor’s share as a result of the protest (in other words, the difference between 
the winner’s share and the loser’s share, which is less than the full quantity, X).  If 
the procurement quantity is 100, the losing vendor can increase its sales by 100 in a 
winner-takes-all contract with a successful protest.  If, however, the winning and 
losing contractor split the procurement 70/30, for example (with the winning vendor 
receiving the larger share), the gains from a successful protest are limited to an 
increase in sales of 40 (the winning share of 70 minus the losing share of 30). 
While there does exist a collection of economic literature investigating split 
award procurement, previous investigations have not considered such split awards 
in the context of potential bid protests. Moreover, existing investigations focus 
almost exclusively on scenarios in which the magnitude of award splits (the shares 
accruing to the winning and losing vendor) are fixed and determined ex ante (or 
exogenously), before bids have even been submitted.5  Even when previous models 
of split award procurements have allowed for variable splits, they generally only 
explore scenarios in which vendors submit a different bid for each potential split, 
creating strong incentives for manipulation by the bidders (a vendor can essentially 
                                            
5 This discussion could easily generalize to multiple vendors where the contract is 
split over the most attractive two or more bids.  For simplicity in presentation, we will 
restrict the discussion here to two vendors, and refer to them as the winning and 
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“veto” any split it does not want by submitting exorbitantly priced bids for the 
undesirable splits. 
In the next section, we first examine bidding and protest incentives with 
traditional fixed award splits.  Then, after explaining the disadvantages of such fixed 
splits (in terms of buyer cost), we explore the potential benefits of endogenous (or ex 
post determined) award splits, in which the ratio of the winning and losing shares 
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Modeling Bid Protests With Split Awards 
Let us understand how incorporation of split awards alters our model of the 
bid protest process and incentives, using the simpler case of fixed award splits. 
Model notation and a process diagram for this scenario are provided in Figure 4.  
The notation is the same as presented previously, with the addition of the definitions 
for contract splits. 
Model Notation: 
Ci  Cost for vendor i 
Pi  Perceived bid price for vendor i 
PiT True bid price for vendor i (revealed by protest or contract 
completion) 
Kp Cost to losing vendor of filing protest (research fees, legal fees, 
reputational penalty, opportunity costs) 
Kb Protest costs incurred by buyer (reevaluation) 
X Quantity purchased 
X × PiT Revenues for vendor i (i.e., buyer’s payment to vendor i) 
X × Ci Production costs for vendor i  
SL Contract share or split awarded to the low-price vendor 
SH Contract share or split awarded to the high-price vendor 
 (where SL + SH = 1, 0 ≤ SH ≤ ½, and ½ ≤ SL ≤ 1) 
With split shares, if the buyer perceives that P1 < P2, vendor 1 is awarded a 
contract to produce SL * X units and vendor 2 is awarded a contract to produce SH * 
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Figure 4. Bid and Protest Process Flow With Ex Ante (Exogenous) Split  
Procurement Shares 
Recall, as derived previously, that the losing vendor will file a protest in the 
presence of winner-take-all contract awards if and only if 
Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi) × X(PjT – Cj) > Kp. (3) 
Following a similar logic, the losing vendor will file a protest under this split 
award scenario if and only if: 
Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi) × X(PjT – Cj) × (SL – SH) > Kp. (4) 
As a result, split awards raise the hurdle for filing bid protests.  The higher the 
contract split accruing to the losing vendor, the higher the hurdle to file a protest.  At 
the extreme, if contractors split the purchase quantity 50/50 (i.e., SL = SH), there is 
no incentive to protest (i.e., no gain).   
More precisely, substituting SL = 1 – SH, the expected profit of a protest is 
given by Equation 5: 
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Taking the partial derivative with respect to SH shows the change in expected 
profit as SH changes: 
= -2 × Prob(PjT < PiT|Pj > Pi) × X(PjT – Cj) < 0. (6) 
Because this derivative is less than zero, the incentive to file a protest 
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Split Awards and Buyer Cost 
While split awards have the advantage of reducing the bid protest incentive, 
they also have the disadvantage of raising buyer costs.  This happens in two ways: 
(1) By awarding a share of the procurement quantity to the higher priced vendor and 
(2) by creating an incentive for vendors to increase their bids even further above 
cost. In this section, we focus on the first cost effect (purchasing from the more 
expensive vendor) and temporarily ignore the second cost effect (bid inflation). Thus, 
we assume for now that vendors submit the same bids under split award competition 
as under winner-take-all competition. 
Thus, assuming the buyer correctly chooses the low-priced vendor, the 
buyer’s total cost in the winner-takes-all (abbreviated in the following equations as 
WTA) case is: 
TCWTA = X × PLT (7) 
Meanwhile, given our momentary assumption that vendor bids are the same 
under each form of competition, the buyer’s total cost with split awards (SAs) is 
given by Equation 8:   
TCSA = X × SH × PHT + X × (1 – SH) × PLT = X × PLT + X × SH × (PHT – PLT). (8) 
Hence, the direct cost increase the buyer incurs (when moving from winner-
take-all to split award contracting) is the quantity awarded to the higher priced 
vendor (X × SH) multiplied by the price difference between the lower and higher 
priced vendor (PHT – PLT).  This additional buyer cost is given by 
TCSA – TCWTA = X × SH × (PHT – PLT). (9) 
Thus, the larger the split given to the higher priced bidder (SH), or the larger 
the difference between the two submitted bids (PHT – PLT), the greater the increase 
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Identifying the “Right” Contract Splits 
While we illustrated in the previous section how split awards would increase 
initial procurement costs, it is important to note that such awards could ultimately 
decrease buyer cost by (1) reducing the buyer costs associated with protests and (2) 
preserving viable competition for potential follow-on competitive procurements. 
Dynamic considerations of such follow-on procurements, as well as learning effects 
and innovation over time, will be a topic of future research. 
In the end, the buyer would want to identify the optimal contract split that 
maximizes total buyer utility, factoring in initial procurement cost, follow-on 
procurement cost, and expected bid protest cost. In terms of managing bid protests, 
the buyer might want to identify the particular contract split that sets the protest 
hurdle at the “right” level—high enough to avoid insignificant, frivolous protests, but 
low enough to encourage protests correcting significant mistakes. Note that it is not 
the intent of the current research to identify or characterize such an optimal fixed 
award split, but instead to explore the potential benefit of contract splits (both fixed 
and endogenous) as a tool for managing the procurement process in the context of 
potential bid protests. 
Operationally, it is important to note that de facto split procurement awards 
are already being used as a bid protest management tool, for example, in the Air 
Force contract for an aerial refueling tanker (Johnsson, 2009).  Contractors filing or 
threatening to file bid protests are often rewarded (appeased) with subcontracts, 
alternative contracts in other procurements, consulting fees, or other agency 
settlements.  This phenomenon is referred to as “Fed-mail,” particularly when the 
protest appears frivolous.  “Buy-offs,” a related phenomenon, involve similar 
appeasements initiated by procurement officials to offset unintentional or intentional 
errors or omissions in the procurement process (GAO, 2009; GAO Office of the 
General Counsel, 2004; Marshall, Meurer, & Richard, 1991; Melese et al., 2010, pp. 
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practice, which is already occurring, and make it an explicit policy tool subject to 
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Bid Inflation Under Fixed Award Splits 
So far we have seen that although split awards can help manage the bid 
protest process, they also increase buyer costs as the contract share awarded to the 
higher priced vendor.  We also mentioned a second, as-yet-unaddressed, buyer cost 
impact of split awards: bid inflation.  Under split award competition, vendors must 
consider whether it is better to receive a lower profit margin on a larger procurement 
share, or a larger profit margin on a smaller procurement share. As all contractors 
feel some incentive to pursue a larger profit margin on a smaller procurement share, 
the buyer’s costs can increase significantly.  This is especially true under fixed 
award splits. 
To simplify our illustration of bid inflation under fixed award splits, it is helpful 
to focus exclusively on the competitive bidding competition without incorporating the 
information or incentive issues that are uniquely related to the bid protest process.  
This is not only helpful but also important because, as we illustrate in this report, the 
bid inflation effect is completely independent of whether protest is possible. 
Thus, let us assume for the moment that, when submitting their bids, vendors 
ignore the “continuation value” of the bid protest process illustrated in Figure 4.  In 
other words, suppose the vendors assume that the buyer’s initial award 
determination will be the final award determination.  From the buyer’s perspective, 
let us similarly assume for the moment that PH = PHT and that PL = PLT or, in other 
words, that the buyer knows each vendor’s prices with certainty and does not 
intentionally misrepresent the vendors’ prices (i.e., there are no contract award 
mistakes, either unintentional or intentional).  Hence, in the remainder of our 
analysis, we will dispense with the superscript T and designate vendor prices (or 
bids), both true and perceived, as simply PH and PL. 
With those simplifying assumptions in place, consider for illustration the case 
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to 100.6  Let each vendor j follow an expected-profit maximizing bidding strategy, 
given by λ(Ci), which maps the vendor j’s unit cost Ci into an optimal bid within the 
range zero to 100.  
Analysis in Appendix A derives the symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding 
strategy for both vendors in this simplified case as a function of the fixed award 
splits, SL and SH.  As shown therein, the optimal symmetric bidding strategy for this 
simplified case is given by Equation 10:  
λ(Ci) =  (10) 
Figure 5 graphically illustrates this equilibrium bidding strategy for various 
fixed award splits.  As shown, the profit-maximizing bid increases as the contract 
split awarded to the higher priced bidder increases.  Under a winner-takes-all 
procurement, the vendor’s profit maximizing bids will vary from 50 to 100 as the 
vendor’s prices vary from zero to 100.  At the other extreme, with equal procurement 
shares accruing to both the high- and low-priced bidders, neither vendor has any 
incentive to bid below the maximum of 100, regardless of cost. 
                                            
6 Bid inflation can be clearly illustrated with this simplified procurement scenario.  
These results could be generalized to multiple bidders and more complicated cost 
functions.  However, additional complication would not change the primary result: 
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Figure 5. Equilibrium Bidding Strategy With Fixed Award Split 
With random costs distributed uniformly over the range from zero to 100, the 
expected price for the low-priced vendor is 33 and 67 for the high-priced vendor.  
The buyer’s expected cost can be calculated under each fixed award share scenario 
using these vendor expected prices and their associated profit-maximizing bids.  The 
resulting buyer costs are depicted in Figure 6.  As shown, the buyer’s average unit 
cost increases from 67 to 100 as the contract split awarded to the high-priced vendor 
increases from zero (winner-take-all) to 50% (equal procurement shares). 
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The Promise of Endogenous (Ex Post) Award Splits 
To this point, we have seen that split procurement awards help manage bid 
protests by reducing the dissatisfied vendor’s expected gain from a protest, but fixed 
award splits increase the buyer’s total cost in two ways.  First, there is a direct 
additional cost as a share of the procurement quantity is shifted to a higher priced 
vendor.  Second, there is also bid inflation among all vendors as fixed award splits 
introduce a strategic incentive to increase one’s bid compared to the optimum bid 
under winner-take-all competition. 
This raises the question whether award splits can be designed and utilized in 
such a way as to maintain their bid protest management characteristics while 
mitigating the negative impact on buyer’s cost.  One possibility is linking the size of 
the contract award split to the size of the difference between the low and high 
vendor bids, such that the share captured by the higher priced vendor decreases as 
the difference between the low- and high-priced bids increases. Under such an 
arrangement, the procurement award split is determined endogenously by the 
vendor bids. 
In an endogenous split award contract competition, the size of the split 
awarded to the higher priced vendor, SH, is determined ex post, after vendor bids PH 
and PL have already been submitted. Moreover, the size of the split SH decreases as 
the difference between the two bids (PH – PL) increases. The closer the two bids are 
together, the greater the split SH awarded to the higher priced vendor. The further 
apart the two bids are, the smaller the split SH. 
The primary advantage of endogenous split awards (over fixed splits) is 
mitigation of the increased buyer cost associated with split award contract 
competition, which was discussed in previous sections. Before formally illustrating 
how endogenous splits mitigate this increased buyer cost, however, let us first 
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fixed contract splits.  To do this, recall that the increased buyer cost from split award 
contract competition (relative to winner-take-all competition) has two components: 
1. The direct cost of purchasing a portion of the quantity desired from the 
higher priced vendor, and 
2. The indirect cost of increasing the incentive for bid inflation. 
As noted previously, the magnitude of the first additional cost component 
above is given by X × SH × (PH – PL).  With endogenous split awards, however, the 
larger the difference between the two bids (PH – PL), the smaller the split SH.  Hence, 
the use of endogenous splits essentially limits or regulates the magnitude of the 
direct additional cost, X × SH × (PH – PL). 
Furthermore, with endogenous split awards, the incentive for bid inflation (the 
second additional cost component noted previously) is also reduced.  To understand 
this, recognize that each vendor maximizes its profit by continuing to increase its bid 
(above cost) as long as the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal cost.  
The marginal benefit of increasing one’s bid is given by the additional margin (Pj – Cj 
for vendor j) received on each unit sold.  Meanwhile, the marginal cost of increasing 
one’s bid has two elements.  First, any increase in a vendor’s bid increases that 
vendor’s likelihood of going from being the low-priced bidder (and ultimately 
receiving the majority split) to being the high-priced bidder (and ultimately receiving 
the minority split).  This first marginal cost is present under both fixed and 
endogenous split awards. 
With endogenous split awards, however, there is an additional marginal cost 
associated with increasing one’s bid that is not present under fixed splits:  Each 
increase in a vendor’s bid directly reduces the split that this particular vendor can 
expect to be awarded (even if submitting a higher bid does not change whether or 
not this vendor is the higher priced or lower priced bidder).  Hence, increasing one’s 
bid under fixed or endogenous split awards essentially provides the same marginal 
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awards that is not present under fixed-split awards. For this reason, the incentive for 
bid inflation is also reduced if contract splits are determined ex post and 
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An Example Endogenous (Ex Post) Award Split 
Function 
To illustrate the cost benefits of endogenous split awards more formally, we 
introduce and investigate the strategic implications of one particular functional form 
for determining contract splits.  In future research we will examine alternative split 
award functions more generally to better identify the optimal policy.  The discussion 
that follows, therefore, should be viewed as a proof of concept for endogenous split 
awards. 
To derive a potential endogenous split award function, let us define RL = 
PL/PH  (so that 0 ≤ RL ≤ 1).  Let SH, the higher priced vendor’s contract split, then be 
expressed as a function of RL, such that SH = F(RL), where 0 ≤ F(RL) ≤ ½, so that the 
contract share awarded to the higher priced vendor cannot exceed 50%. 
Furthermore, it is necessary that F(RL) be increasing in RL, so that the contract share 
awarded to the higher priced vendor increases as the higher and lower vendor 
prices converge. 
One potential specification for F(RL) that satisfies these conditions is given by 
SH = αRLβ, where α is the maximum share awarded the high priced vendor (0 ≤ α ≤ 
½), and β ≥ 0.  In this case, SH is increasing in α and RL, and decreasing in β.  To 
summarize this example endogenous split award function, we have 
RL = PL/PH  
SH = F(RL) = αRLβ where 0 ≤ α ≤ ½ and β ≥ 0. 
The versatility and potential for this example endogenous split award function 
can be first illustrated by looking at scenarios with various alternative values for α 
and β, as shown in Table 1.  One feature of this functional form is that it is 
generalizable enough to represent, given the appropriate values for α and β, several 
common split award rules. As indicated in the table, this endogenous split award 
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to fixed award splits if β = 0.  As a result, this award split function can represent both 
extreme cases, as well as intermediate cases. Furthermore, adjusting the values for 
α and β will influence vendor bidding strategies and (therefore) buyer costs, so the 
buyer must choose α and β to maximize utility (or, alternatively, minimize cost), 
inclusive of the costs and benefits of potential bid protests, follow-on procurements, 
and so on. 
Table 1. Endogenous Split Award Scenarios With SH = αRLβ 
 
To further illustrate the dynamics of this functional form for determining 
endogenous award splits, Figure 7 shows how the award split accruing to the high-
priced vendor varies for different values of both β and RL = PL/PH, when α = 0.4 
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Figure 7. Split Award Scenarios With α = 0.4 and SH = 0.4RLβ 
As illustrated in Figure 7, when β = 0, SH becomes a fixed-split amount at the 
maximum share allowed under this scheme (40% when α = 0.4).  When β = ∞, SH 
equals zero in all cases, yielding a winner-take-all scheme.  As PL/PH approaches 
one, where vendors have similar prices, the high-priced vendor’s share approaches 
its maximum possible value (again 40% when α = 0.4). On the other hand, as PL/PH 
approaches zero, signifying that the low-priced vendor is significantly less expensive 












































Figure 8. Split Award Scenarios With α = 0.5 and SH = 0.5RLβ 
Similar patterns emerge as α assumes values between 0 and 0.5, but the 
maximum value for SH, depicted on the vertical axis, adjusts accordingly.  For 
example, Figure 8 shows how the award split accruing to the high-priced vendor 
varies for different values of both β and RL = PL/PH, when α = 0.5 (meaning that 50% 
is the maximum share awarded to the high-priced vendor).  The same dynamics are 
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Identifying Comparable Fixed and Endogenous 
Split Rules 
So how would vendor bids and buyer cost differ under the example 
endogenous split rule (SH = αRLβ) from bids and cost under a comparable fixed-split 
rule?  We have already begun to answer this question qualitatively, using the 
intuition described in previous sections.  In order to derive a more precise answer, 
however, the first challenge is to identify a fairly “comparable” pair of endogenous 
versus fixed-split rules.  In other words, we must be certain we are making a 
reasonable “apples-to-apples” comparison between the two approaches. 
For the fixed-split half of our comparison, let us choose ex ante splits of SH = 
0.4 and SL = 0.6.  Recall that, with C1, C2  ~ U[0,100], the equilibrium bidding 
strategy under fixed splits is given by Equation 11: 
λ(Ci) = . (11) 
With SH = 0.4 and SL = 0.6, this equilibrium strategy for vendor bids becomes 
λ(Ci) = . (12) 
Moreover, note that the equilibrium average buyer cost under such fixed splits 
was 94 per unit, as shown in Figure 6.  Now we must only determine an endogenous 
split rule which is fairly comparable to fixed splits of SH = 0.4 and SL = 0.6. 
In particular, what values of α and β will generate an endogenous split award 
function, SH = αRLβ, which we can reasonably and fairly compare to our candidate 
fixed-split rule?  We propose that the values α = ½ and β = 4, yielding a split award 
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graphical illustration of how award splits are determined under each rule for various 
values of RL = PL/PH. 
 
Figure 9. Split Award Scenarios With SH = 40% vs. SH = ½RL4 
These rules certainly look a lot different in Figure 9, so how do we justify the 
validity of comparing outcomes under these two rules?  To do so, we must show 
that, given the same vendor bidding under each approach, procurement outcomes 
(and thus costs) are the same or similar.  In particular, using fixed- and endogenous 
split rules, which yield similar outcomes (and costs) given similar vendor bidding, 
allows us to isolate the differences between the two approaches that are specifically 
attributable to the differing effects on vendor bidding incentives (and not due to our 
specific choice of fixed- or endogenous split rules). 
With that in mind, Appendix B illustrates the similarity (and comparability) of 
the fixed-split rule SH = 0.4 and the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4.  In particular, if 
both vendors continue to bid according to the fixed-split equilibrium bidding strategy 
given by Equation 11 our endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4 will still yield both an 
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to 0.4 and a median split for the high-priced vendor (i.e., a median value of SH = 
½RL4) equal to 0.4 as well.  Hence, our two split rules do indeed provide a 
reasonable apples-to-apples comparison between fixed and endogenous award 
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Equilibrium Bidding and Cost Under Endogenous 
Award Splits 
So how can we expect vendors to actually bid under the endogenous split 
function SH = ½RL4?  In the previous section, we demonstrated that, if vendors 
continue to follow the fixed-split bidding strategy for SH = 0.4 under this endogenous 
split rule, the expected (average) and median values of the resulting split would still 
be SH = 0.4.  But is this same bidding strategy still optimal when splits are 
endogenous? 
Unfortunately, determining a closed-form solution for the Nash equilibrium 
bidding strategy under the example endogenous split rule SH = αRLβ is particularly 
complicated and remains an objective for future research.  That said, given particular 
values for α and β, we can calculate the equilibrium bidding strategy computationally 
(or numerically).  We do this using an “iterative best-response” approach. 
This iterative equilibrium calculation proceeds via the following steps: 
1. Start by assuming vendor 1 follows the equilibrium bidding strategy 
under the fixed split SH = 0.4, which was given by Equation 12.  Label 
this bidding strategy for vendor 1 as λ1,1(C), where the first subscript 
designates the vendor and the second subscript designates the 
iteration or step. 
2. Next, for each possible vendor 2 cost (C2) between 0 and 100 (using 
increments as small as computationally possible), compute vendor 2’s 
optimal bid (or “best response”) given vendor 1’s bidding strategy 
λ1,1(C) and the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4. Combining all such 
vendor 2 optimal bids yields a best-response bidding strategy for 
vendor 2.  Label this bidding strategy λ2,2(C). 
3. Next, for each possible vendor 1 cost (C1) between 0 and 100, 
compute vendor 1’s optimal bid (or “best response”) given vendor 2’s 
bidding strategy λ2,2(C) and the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4.  
Combining all such vendor 1 optimal bids yields a best-response 
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 
N. Next, for each possible vendor 2 cost (C2) between 0 and 100, 
compute vendor 2’s optimal bid (or “best response”) given vendor 1’s 
bidding strategy λ1,N-1(C) and the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4. 
Combining all such vendor 2 optimal bids yields a best-response 
bidding strategy for vendor 2. Label this bidding strategy λ2,N(C). 
N+1. Next, for each possible vendor 1 cost (C1) between 0 and 100, 
compute vendor 1’s optimal bid (or “best response”) given vendor 2’s 
bidding strategy λ2,N(C) and the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4. 
Combining all such vendor 1 optimal bids yields a best-response 
bidding strategy for vendor 1. Label this bidding strategy λ1,N+1(C). 
 
We continue this iterative process until reaching a “fixed-point” best-response 
bidding strategy.  In other words, the equilibrium bidding strategy is identified when 
λi,n - 1(C) ≈ λj,n(C) ≈ λi,n + 1(C) for some n > 1. 
The equilibrium outcome of this iterative best-response computation process 
for our chosen endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4 is illustrated by the blue line in 
Figure 10.  This figure shows that the equilibrium bids under this endogenous split 
rule are significantly lower than the equilibrium bids under the comparable fixed-split 
rule SH = 0.4 (red line in Figure 10).  Moreover, the equilibrium bids under this 
endogenous split rule are actually closer (for most vendor costs) to the equilibrium 
bids under winner-take-all competition (green line in Figure 10), which is the least-






















SH = ½RL4 
SH = 40% 
SH = 0% 
(Winner-Take-All) 
C1 ~ U[0,100] 
C2 ~ U[0,100] 
 
Figure 10. Equilibrium Bidding Strategies With SH = 0% vs.  
SH = 40% vs. SH = ½RL4 
With the equilibrium bidding strategy under the rule SH = ½RL4 thus derived, 
we can now calculate the average cost per unit for the buyer under this endogenous 
split rule.  The results (and comparisons to fixed-split and winner-take-all 
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Figure 11. Average Price per Unit Under Various Award Splits 
We have previously discussed (see Figure 6) how the buyer’s average unit 
cost was calculated for fixed splits and for winner-take-all competition.  For the case 
of the endogenous split rule SH = ½RL4, the average cost was calculated via 
simulation (or computation). 
The essential elements of this simulation were as follows: 
1. Costs for vendor 1 and vendor 2 (C1 and C2) were randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution over the range 0 to 100. 
2. The computed equilibrium bidding function (illustrated by the blue line 
in Figure 10) was then used to determine the combination of bids (P1 
and P2) associated with the two vendor costs drawn in Step 1. 
3. From the vendor bids calculated in Step 2, the award split was 
determined using the rule SH = ½RL, where RL = PL/PH. 
4. Average buyer cost was then calculated using the following formula: 
Average Buyer Cost = SH × PH + SL × PL = SH × PH + (1 – SH) × PL = PL 
+ (PH - PL) × SH 
Repeating Steps 1 through 4 for hundreds of iterations produces an average 
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Contrast this with the average cost per unit of 94 under the fixed-split rule SH = 0.4 
and the average cost per unit of 67 under winner-take-all competition. 
In sum, moving from winner-take-all competition to split procurement with 
fixed splits increases initial procurement cost for the buyer.  Moving from fixed award 
splits to endogenous award splits, however, eliminates about half of this increased 
buyer cost, while retaining the other benefits of split award procurement, such as 
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Conclusions 
This research has applied game-theoretic modeling and computational 
analysis to investigate two common elements of the procurement process: bid 
protests and split-award contracts.  More directly, we have explored the interaction 
between these two procurement features, asking how split-award contracts might be 
used to manage bid protests. 
On the topic of bid protests in general, it is important to emphasize that the 
objective of any procurement reform in this area should be to manage, not minimize, 
the number and nature of bid protests.  In particular, the purchasing organization or 
agency would like to encourage efficient protests that serve to identify, address, and 
potentially correct significant procurement mistakes, while discouraging those 
“frivolous” or inefficient bid protests that do not offer the potential to make significant, 
valuable corrections. 
This research has further shown that split-award contracts offer one potential 
level for managing bid protests.  The use of split awards, as opposed to winner-take-
all contract awards, reduces the magnitude of potential gain from successful protest.  
Hence, with split-award contracts, the losing bidder has less incentive to file a 
protest, and will, therefore, only do so when the probability of prevailing in the 
protest process is very high.  In other words, the presence of split awards helps to 
discourage those wasteful protests having little chance of success, while preserving 
the incentive to file efficient protests in which it seems very clear (at least to the 
losing bidder) that a significant procurement mistake has been made.  This is exactly 
the type of protest “filtering” that we would like to see from any proposed reform. 
Thus, split-award contracts may offer benefits in terms of protest 
management.  This is in addition to other potential benefits previously demonstrated 
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during the initial procurement, preserving competition for follow-on procurement, and 
attracting more vendors to compete for the contract. 
That said, we also demonstrated as part of the research that split-award 
contracts have a disadvantage (relative to “winner-take-all” contracts), which is 
higher total procurement cost for the buyer.  The buyer’s cost under split-award 
contracts is higher for two reasons: (1) A portion of the contract is procured from a 
higher priced vendor, and (2) the split awarded to a higher price vendor increases 
the incentive for vendors to inflate their bids.  In the case of fixed-award splits (i.e., 
where the splits awarded to the low-price and high-price vendor are determined ex 
ante), we showed that the additional cost incurred by the buyer (relative to winner-
take-all contract competition) can be significant. 
Fortunately, however, our research uncovered and illustrated a potential 
(partial) solution to this problem of increased buyer cost: Endogenous award splits, 
which are determined ex post, based on the actual bids submitted, with the split 
awarded to the higher priced vendor being larger the more competitive this “losing” 
vendor’s bid is.  When award splits are determined in this fashion, we demonstrated 
that the increase in buyer cost (over winner-take-all competition) is significantly 
mitigated. 
In sum, split-award contracts offer a potential lever for efficient management 
of bid protests, as well as other potential benefits.  Moreover, while split-awards do 
involve higher buyer costs, this disadvantage can be effectively mitigated through 
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Research Agenda Moving Forward 
Our research agenda moving forward on this project first and foremost 
includes several extensions or generalizations to our model of the bid protest and 
contract competition process.  For example, we hope to expand the number of 
competing vendors in the model as well as expanding the number of contract splits 
available to the competitors.  In particular, it would be helpful to investigate 
scenarios in which the number of competitors exceeds the number of contract splits 
available, to see whether this mitigates the bid-inflation effect. 
Expanding the number of contract splits beyond two will, of course, require 
investigation of more complex split functions, which endogenously determine how a 
contract would be divided among three or more winning vendors, based on their 
submitted bids.  Moreover, the split function might even endogenously determine the 
number of contract splits, such that whether there will be two, three, four, or more 
splits is not known until after bids have been submitted. 
Another natural extension to the model would be the inclusion of economies 
of scale.  For many procured products or services, vendors will experience 
significant economies of scale in production, primarily due to the necessity of 
incurring significant fixed costs that are independent of the volume produced.  Such 
economies of scale actually create another important cost consideration (and 
disadvantage) for split-award contracts: A single vendor could produce the entire 
procurement quantity at a lower cost than could multiple vendors each producing 
only a portion of this total quantity.  It is natural and important, therefore, to 
incorporate such economies of scale in any model investigating split-award 
contracting.  The easiest way to do so would be to incorporate a fixed-cost element 
into each vendor’s cost structure.  For example, vendor j’s total cost to produce a 
quantity X could be given by Cj(X) = Fj + X × Vj, where Fj represents vendor j’s fixed 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 48 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Vendors could then submit two-dimensional bids, consisting of a fixed-bid 
component and a variable-bid component. 
A final, but critical, model extension would be to allow for repeated 
procurements.  Considering that one of the primary arguments in favor of split-award 
contracts is the preservation of competition for follow-on contracts, it is again both 
natural and important to incorporate repeated competitive procurements involving 
the same set of (potential) vendors.  Any such repeated game model of procurement 
would need to include inter-temporal effects such as experience or learning 
(production costs declining over time as cumulative historical production increases) 
as well as possible innovation (production costs declining due to innovation 
investment and/or random shocks).  A repeated procurement model would further 
incorporate a discount factor, representing the lower net present value of future 
costs and revenues, and/or the likelihood that procurement of that particular product 
or service could terminate after that particular iteration of the game.  With such 
discounting of future procurements, the entire repeated game could presumably be 
solved via recursive economic methods. 
With our model of the bid protest and contract competition process extended 
and/or generalized as described here, a number of important research questions 
become more validly addressed.  First and foremost, we would like to determine or 
provide some guidance as to (1) under what conditions split-award procurement is 
preferred to winner-take-all procurement competition; and (2) when split-award 
procurement is indeed preferred, what is the optimal endogenous split function, 
taking into account (a) the buyer’s objective to maximize long-term expected utility 
(or minimize cost), (b) including the cost of bid protests as well as the corrective 
benefits of such protests, and (c) also including the impact of other benefits of split-
award contract competition.  We also intend to explore model dynamics, 
comparative statics, and sensitivity analyses in which we determine the impact of 
changes in key variables, such as vendor and buyer information, the costs of 
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We hope to explore all of these questions with the unique combination of 
research methodologies we utilize within our overall research agenda of applying the 
field of mechanism design to the context of defense procurement. These 
methodologies include game-theoretic analysis and dynamics, numerical 
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Appendix A. Optimal Bidding Strategy With Fixed- 
Split Awards 
Assume that the procurement being considered is a one-shot procurement 
with no follow-on options.  Also, assume that the buyer is perfectly informed 
regarding the vendors’ prices P1 and P2 (i.e., Pi = PiT).  With perfect information, 
there is no need for bid protests.  The bidding strategy model can be written as 
follows: 
Ci  Cost for vendor i 
Pi  True bid price for vendor i 
X Quantity purchased 
X(Pi) Revenues for vendor i; buyer’s cost 
X(Ci) Production costs for vendor i  
SL Contract share or split awarded the low-price vendor 
SH Contract share or split awarded the high-price vendor 
 where: SL + SH = 1; 0 ≤ SH ≤ ½; ½ ≤ SL ≤ 1 
For simplicity, assume two vendors, though the model can be easily 
generalized to multiple vendors.  A vendor’s expected profit becomes 
E1(P1)  = X(P1 – C1)Prob(P1 > P2)SH + Prob(P1 < P2)SL 
= X(P1 – C1)Prob(P1 > P2)SH+1 – Pr(P1 > P2)SL 
= X(P1 – C1)SL + Prob(P1 > P2)(SH – SL) 
= X(P1 – C1)SL - Prob(P1 > P2)(SL – SH). 
Assume C1 and C2 are identically and independently distributed over the 
interval [0,M], with distribution function F(C) and density function f(C)  F’(C).  Also, 
assume both vendors follow symmetric bidding strategies λ(C), where 
λ(C): [0,M]  [0,M]  
λ(M) = M. 
The optimal bid for vendor 1, assuming vendor 1 has cost C1 and vendor 2 is 
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Prob(P2 < P1) = Prob λ(C2) < P1 = ProbC2 < λ-1(P1) = F λ-1(P1). 
E1(P1) = X(P1 – C1)SL – Prob(P1 > P2)(SL – SH) 
= X(P1 – C1)SL – F λ-1(P1)(SL – SH). 
Using the Chain Rule and the inverse derivate theorem yields 
E1/P1 = XSL – F λ–1(P1)(SL – SH) 
= X(P1 – C1)(SL – SH)f λ–1(P1) / λ′ λ–1(P1). 
The first-order condition for profit maximization is 
SL – F λ-1(P1)(SL – SH) = (P1 – C1)(SL – SH)f λ-1(P1)/ λ′ λ-1(P1)  
λ′ λ-1(P1))[SL – F λ-1(P1)(SL – SH] = (P1 – C1)(SL – SH)f λ-1(P1) 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, P1 = λ(C1)  λ-1(P1) = C1, thus 
λ′C1[SL – FC1(SL – SH] = (λ(C1) – C1)(SL – SHfC1 
SLλ′C1 = (SL – SH[FC1λ′C1 + λ(C1)fC1 – C1fC1] 
(SL – SH[FC1λ′C1 + fC1 λ(C1)] = SLλ′C1 + C1(SL – SHfC1 
(SL – SH [FC1λC1 = SLλ′C1 + C1(SL – SHfC1. 
Integrating both sides of this equation over the definite interval [C1,M] yields 
(SL SH) C1
F(C1)(C1) dC1C1
M =	SL  (C1)dC1C1
M (SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M  
(SL SH) F(M)(M)F(C1)(C1)  	=	SL (M)(C1)  (SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M  
(SL SH) MF(C1)(C1)  	=	SL M(C1)  (SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M  
SLMSHM(SL SH)F(C1)(C1)	=	SLMSL(C1)(SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M  
SHM(SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M 	=	 SL SH F(C1)(C1)SL(C1)  
SHM(SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
M 	=	SL(C1) SL SH F(C1)(C1) 
SHM(SL SH) C1f(C1)dC1C1
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SHM(SL SH) 1F(C1)  C1f(C1)dC1C1
M
1F(C1)
	=	(C1) SL SLF(C1)SHF(C1)   
SHM(SL SH) 1F(C1) E C2 C2 C1  	=	(C1) SL  SL SH F(C1)   
(C1)	=	
SHM(SL SH) 1F(C1) E C2 C2 C1 
SL  SL SH F(C1)  
λ(C1) provides the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy whenever vendor 
costs C1 and C2 are identically and independently distributed over some interval 
[0,M]. 
As further illustration and exploration, consider the case when vendor unit 
costs are uniformly distributed over the range from zero to 100.  In this case, the 
equilibrium bidding strategy in equation (5) becomes: 
(C1)	=	




100SH (SL SH) 1‐ 1100C1  12 C1 100 
SL  1100(SL SH)C1
 
(C1)	=	


















Thus, the symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for vendor j (j = 1 or 2) 
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Appendix B. Optimal Bidding Strategy With Fixed- 
Split Awards 
In this appendix, we explain how we determined that the endogenous split 
rule SH = ½RL4 was fairly comparable to the fixed split rule SH = 0.40.  In particular, 
to provide a “fair” comparison, we wanted a endogenous split rule that would yield 
similar results to the fixed split rule, under identical bidding strategies. 
Because the fixed split rule always yields a predetermined split, SH = 0.40 in 
our example here, we wanted to verify that our chosen endogenous split rule would 
generate similar splits given identical bidding strategies.  However, an endogenous 
split rule will generate a different split for different sets of bids.  Therefore, the best 
measure of comparability was to calculate the median and/or average split 
generated by the chosen endogenous split rule, assuming identical bidding to the 
derived equilibrium bid strategy with a fixed split of SH = 0.40. 
Thus, we looked at all possible combinations of vendor costs C1 and C2 (for 
all integer values between 0 and 100) and then determined the combination of 
equilibrium bids (or prices) using the previously calculated symmetric equilibrium 
bidding strategy for a fixed split of SH = 0.40 as follows: 
P1 = λ(C1) =   and  P2 = λ(C2) = ß  
For each possible combination of prices generated this way, we then 
calculated the ratio of low bid price (PL) to high bid price (PH) given by RL = PL/PH.  
With this ratio, we then calculated the endogenous split SH = ½RL4 for all possible 
combinations of vendor costs C1 and C2 (for all integer values between 0 and 100). 
Looking at the distribution of realized splits under the rule SH = ½RL4 for all 
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value of SH equal to 0.40. Thus, we conclude that the endogenous split rule SH = 
½RL4 provides a reasonable comparison for the fixed split rule SH = 0.40. 
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